Lake Comacchio

HEADQUARTERS
755TH TANK BATTALION
APO 464
U.S. ARMY

REPORT
ON PREPARATION FOR AND EXECUTION OF
AMPHIBIOUS OPERATIONS
WITH THE BRITISH EIGHTH ARMY
ON LACK COMACCHIO, ITALY

       This is a report on the "OPERATION IMPACT," its beginnings, problems, and incidents which went to make it unusual -- the first of its kind in the Mediterranean Theater of Operation, United States Army. It tells briefly how an American Tank Battalion turned momentarily from fighting a war in tanks and learned something of amphibious operations. A new piece of equipment the "Water Buffalo" was given to men with average mechanical aptitudes. these men mastered its functioning and operation for use in combat.

    Intensified training on a large scale -- first on the ARNO RIVER, and later on beautiful LAKE TRASIMENE in central Italy -- was conducted jointly with BRitish troops. It was a race against the ever present time element -- reaching the ultimate aim of all training-- success in combat.

    Period 24 February 1945 to 28 February 1945

    The 755th Tank Battalion, relieved from front line duty for the first time since going in in September 1944, moved to PISA, ITALY charged with the mission of taking over, training and preparing to operate "Landing Vehicles, Tractors" under combat conditions in the near future.

    The first step, naturally, was the move from front line to the rear area. The battalion, less armor, arrived in PISA area on the morning of 214 February, and went into garrison. The 755th ws attached to the 39th Engineer Combat Regiment, at this time having only one battalion of engineers at its disposal.

    The battalion training and garrison area was part of the PBS Staging Area on the north bank of the ARNO RIVER, and to the west of the city of PISA, which has the port of LEGHORN nearby, therefore having port facilities for rapid, secret movement of any new equipment the 755th might use. That was one situation.

    Lt. Johnson, Ordnance Dept., U.S.A., who flew from the States, was attached to work with the Battalion training, maintenance and operation personnel, until such a time as we could walk on our feet, in water.

   We received our first vehicles, which we promptly called "T.S." vehicles (and which will be called that in the rest of this document), on the nights of 26 and 27 February. They were turned over to guards furnished by two companies of the 366th

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Infantry Regiment, colored companies, in a park near the river. Areas were cleared of mines, C.I.C screened and evaluated some civilians, and the security angle was brought home at every possible opportunity to every officer and enlisted man of this command., as well as those of other units who happened to be working around our T.S. vehicles at the time -- ordnance, signal, quartermaster, etc. It was necessary to lean over backwards in keeping this affair secret. Even then we found there was loose talk of it outside the area in nearby towns -- on the part of officers.

    At the close of the month, everyone was learning his particular job on the new vehicles, which include Quonset barges and Landing Craft, Mechanical and getting squared away on training to come. Camp was set up, and we were ready to go.

    PERIOD 1 March to 20 March 1945.

    On 1 March, a party went to the port of LEGHORN, to bring back up the ARNO RIVER, two Landing Craft, Mechanical. These were the first of the LCM's to be received for training. They were put in charge of an officer, who was the most qualified specialist working with them. Also, this was the case with the Quonset barges. One officer and hand picked non-coms were doing preparatory training and testing, and then later, every man in the battalion was to be qualified on all three types. After that ws to come more extensive training with infantry task forces, after personnel of these Battalion had learned the vehicles. This was canceled due to the lack of time.

   First all officers of the Battalion were taken on a "wet run" operation of T.S. vehicles. We used seven the first time in the water. We found them very easy to handle in the water, but getting them out of the river, over the banks, was next to impossible on other than a prepared landing strip. They do not have sufficient power, we found, and the construction was such that they would sink, belly up, and no matter how much power an engine would have, the design of the vehicle was such that getting out of the river though any mud at all was very difficult. That was our first experience with them. to old tank men, it was disappointing. Further, we had trouble with transmissions getting hot, oil pressures dropping, and track bolts shearing. These were a few of our first mechanical difficulties.

    A few criticisms of the vehicles include the fact that some people believed the engines were not powerful enough, that track were not wide enough, that the armor was not heavy enough to stop even armor piercing machine-gun bullets. Some thought that the steering devices, which are solely bu means of track, were not effective. There were no steps on the which a man could stand to fire his machine-gun. Some sort of a folding developments and experiments we conducted and found around.

    On the other hand, things we found to our liking were the radios, and new type of microphone (lip mike), interphone switch boxes and rubber mountings. The water-tight boxes or cabinets which house the radios proved very effective in keeping the radios dry during waterborne operations. the spare parts box for radio equipment such as tubes, fuses, etc., which was shaped like an SCR 538 and could be

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mounted on the mounting base, was widely applauded by using personnel. This would have been very welcome to our men for their tanks during the campaign.

    It must be stated here that our earliest experience with the LVT's were in the ARNO. The banks we tried to climb certainly were not anything like those that the vehicles were designed to use -- the shallow sloping beaches common to the islands of the Pacific. The ARNO's banks were sandy, muddy and apparently bottomless in spots, in addition to being steep, normally much too steep for such a vehicle to negotiate. Perhaps our early experiments were unfair -- too steep or too muddy.

    A party, consisting of the Battalion Commander, his communications Officer, and the engineer commanders, next next went to REVENNA, To attend an EIGHT ARMY demonstration of the LVT. Nearly every general who had any sort of a high command in the EIGHT ARMY attended. It consisted of two LVT's going into canals and coming up the banks. Originally, the 15TH ARMY GROUP had planned on attaching us to the EIGHT ARMY for operations in the near future. We thought that perhaps because they were not too happy with the LVT's on the strength of demonstration, the high command might call the whole show off. Time would tell. It was not called off.

    During this time we continued to get more T.S. vehicles in groups off seven or eight at a time. Meanwhile, crews were training on them, getting to know them mechanically, their capabilities and limitations, breaking in the engines, learning maintenance. British and American ordnance officers worked with us, supervising and advising on technical matters, This period was called " individual training", when each man learned his job. The bigger part, tactics, came later.

       PERIOD 21 March to 1 April 1945

    To put these preliminary plans into operation, it was necessary to move to a training area of sufficient size to enable simultaneous launching, maneuvering, and landing of squadrons of T.S. vehicles, "fantails." Such a training area was LAKE TRASIMENE. The Battalion plus the "Fantails", moved to TRASIMENE in the third week of March, vehicles moving by transporters provided by the EIGHT ARMY. We were attached to the EIGHT ARMY when we reached the   TRASIMENE area, under the command of the 9 Armored Brigade, veterans of LIBYA and EGYPT. Our bivouac area was an old Italian airfield of CASTIGLIONE, the British unit which trained with us used POSSIGNANO, an Italian naval air station of former days.

    TRASIMENE was four of five miles in breath, slightly more than that in length, . This afforded ample room and opportunity for extended training of any and all said "Fantails" units-- up to and including regiment. For security reasons screening and a strict guard system was necessary, in addition to considerable smoking of all towns and villages around the area. It was forbidden to evacuate, civilians so the next best thing was "just the job" as our british friends said. The screen was 12 foot affair, strung on poles, hessian burlap, covered with camouflage nets. The effect of this was to prohibit close-up view of the "Fantails" by curious civilians, at least we hoped that was the effect.

    Before we could engage in large-scale training activities, it was necessary to modify some of our "Fantails," for radios, recovery vehicles, etc.

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British REME workshops "got cracking" on command vehicles, building canvas tops on squadron commanders' "Fantails," installing compasses in some vehicles for navigational purposes. After further modifications, such as fitting of fixtures for litters in medical vehicles, training was begun 24 March, under a schedule designed to get us through three weeks earlier than originally intended.

    the first period of troop and squadron training consisted of mostly of driving in various formations. A troop, and then an entire squadron, had to learn to launch "two-up," that is, in a double line of vehicle -- 50 yards apart laterally and 100 yards between vehicle in the column length. That was the basic formation. However, in order to become accustom to forming "line abreast" in the event that we would land on a wide open beach, troops and squadrons practiced that formation also. In approaching a proposed landing area, the troops or squadron moved near the beach in "two-up" column formation then at a signal from the commander, swung into "line abreast." This would speed the landing, subsequent unloading of infantry, and in general, the whole landing operation. When the vehicles had landed, deposited their troops on dry ground inland, the "Fantails" would move back into the water, wait for the remainder of their particular squadron, then return to base, simulating returning fort reinforcements and supplies for the "bulid-up" on the beach-head.

    Since, this "amphibious" training was patterned after large scale combined operations, our formations actually formed a nd moved in a similar fashion, The first two troops normally carried two companies of infantry, the third troop to land, carried the infantry battalion headquarters and staff, the fourth troop carried mortars. The fifth troop carried anti-tank guns and administrative personnel. Scattered throughout all troops were jeeps and "weasels" needed later on the beach for various things.

    In the advanced stages of training, we conducted landing exercises with the infantry we later carried in combat. The infantry was the 2/5 Queens and the 2/6 Queens, of the 56 (London) Division, one of the best in the British Army. The infantry were loaded on the "Fantails," the operation was launch, moved to various points on LAKE TRASIMENE, then headed for a beach, landed and pushed on to objectives. One of the maneuvers was conducted at night, and we landed at dawn - the particular dawn was Easter Sunday morning.   we learned from these exercises the commanders' particular habits, their manners of operating and just what their desires were. Furthermore, radio nets were experimented with, we learned what worked, and what did not. Many bugs were ironed out, an peculiarities on the part of men and machines dealt with.

     We operated on the big time invasion principle that we, the "Fantail" people, ran the show on the water -- that is, during the movement to the beaches the time we were on the water. When the troops had all been landed, "then the army takes over." this fundamental concept was strictly adhered to, and it rested with the "Fantail commander to make decision during the trip by water, The "navy" landed the troops, then " the army took over"

       PERIOD 2 April to 13 April 1945.

    "A" and "B" Squadrons wound up training on Easter Sunday morning. They completed moving by tank transporters on 5 April, to forward concentrtai

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area three miles north of RAVENNA, on the EIGHTH ARMY front, near the ADRIATIC. Prior to this time "W" , "X", and "E" Squadrons of the BRITISH RASC regiment had moved to this concentration area. WE assembled in the same areas. The original operational plans called for movement across LAKE COMACCHIO to the north.

But when we had become settled in that concentration area, we had a major disappoint. The Lake (COMACCHIO), for which we had trained and practiced these many weeks, was unnavigable for "Fantails." Not deep enough just a muddy lagoon. We wondered why that had not been taken into consideration before, Perhaps it had.

    Test wee conducted therefore, in the area of COMACCHIO, to determine whether certain other operations were practicable in the vicinity. Previously, the "W" Squadron had carried commandos and Royal Marines across part of the Lake, the southern part, to COMACCHIO spit, and caught the Germans by surprise. The performance by the "Fantails" on this operation apparently impressed the top commanders, including Field Marshal ALEXANDER, who paid us a visit, for we were ordered to prepare for operations, using "Fantails." The 9 Armoured (SIC) Brigade (British) ws to plan and execute OPERATION IMPACT.

    The plan called for carrying (by "A" and "B" Squadrons) of the 169 Infantry Brigade (British), composed of the 2/5 and the 2/6 Queens with the 2/7 Queens in reserve, across the flooded area south of LAKE COMACCHIO proper from a launching site at M492556. The infantry objective were LONGASTRINO (M420573) and MENATE (M418588). That was the plan in general. If successful it would advance the front lines by three miles.

    On 11 April at 0430b, the infantry began loading into our "Fantails" on STRDA DELLA RATTA, beside FOSSO RENO CANAL. Things were late all the way around, so daylight found us just preparing to launch instead of being well on the way. we were fearful of being shelled in the column, but apparently Jerry's observation was not as good as we thought. Perhaps the smoke cut it down considerably.

    "A" and "B" Squadrons launched at 0827B and 0837B respectively -- and we were dubious as to any surprise after that.

    Smoke parties had been stationed along the route to the to the landing sites, to prevent observation of any movement on the water. The smoke was effective. we encountered no trouble, or opposition, until the leading troop of "A" Squadron had nearly touched down on its landing site, M421599. The first troop of "A" Squadron landed at 1005 hours. Infantry unloaded quickly and took prisoners even before the vehicles had stopped rooling (SIC) An M4 tank was parked beside a house on the beach, and had it been aware of the terrible vulnerability of the "Fantail," it could have knocked out sever on the beach. However, the first troop of squadron put up a big bluff, kept on moving right toward the tank with .50 cal. machine guns and 20mm Oerlikon guns cracking and the tank crew surrendered without a fight. A German Mark VI was reported to have fled the scene. One wonders at s big bully like a Mark VI running from peanut shell wit a .50 cl., but strange things do happen. This was the report. If it is true, it is a good story.

    Initial shell fire was light, some mortar, we suffered eight casualties in both squadrons. Three "Fantails" were knocked, two of which burned.

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As the beach head grew nd the hours dragged by, shell fire, small arms, and   mortar fire got heavier. But by that time we had unloaded and departed. We left a representative, Major C. H. Hickman, on the beach with the Brigade Command with a radio back to us, to keep us informed. Later "B" Squadron returned to the beach head carrying t he 2/7 Queens in the reinforcement or "build up stage." The "build-up" was completed that same day by nightfall.

    OPERATION IMPACT had advance our front lines, captured 250 prisoners, kicked Jerry in the pants, caused him to begin troop diversion from other sectors. It was dubbed by the EIGHT ARMY COMMANDER as quite a success.

    Because of the success of this unique maneuver we had pulled against the enemy in OPERATION IMPACT, a further operation was decided upon by the EIGHT ARMY COMMANDER. It was to be executed by the 9 Armoured (SIC) Brigade again, "A" and "B" Squadrons, 755th Tank Battalion, plus attachments of "X" and "E" Squadrons of the RASC regiment -- the four squadron operating under a Provisional Regimental Headquarters of the 755th Tank Battalion. we were to carry the 9 Commando Battalion and the First Battalion of the Buffs, part of the 24 Guards Brigade (British). Also very fine fighting men. We would again flank German position. This show was to be a big one, with our own artillery going with us. Reconnaissance and smoke parties were to precede the main body, and engineers were to blow holes in the dikes so the "Fantails" would be able to cross. The operation, OPERATION IMPACT ROYAL, was set up for Friday, 13 April.

       "A" Squadron, carrying the No. 9 Commandos, had an objective at M338634, with an alternate objective at M356613. "B" Squadron and the Buffs were land at M338634, with an alternate at M356613. This would land us ahead another two miles.

    The first parties to launch the morning of 13 April were Reconnaissance and smoke Parties. They proceed the main body by a good two hours. Artillery, a battery of 25 pounders, followed by a few minutes, the "B" Squadron, Headquarters, and "A" Squadron. We moved in two columns,   "two-up" in each column the launching site used was of the ones used the previous day, but the time was earlier. We had to travel the same route to the area where we landed on 11 APril, then proceed father to the objectives.

    We dared only to hope the operation would go as smoothly as the first. We doubted, way down deep, if we would catch Jerry napping twice. You do not do that wit the German.   However, we were told we should be able to do some good. when we neared our landing sites, things started to go wrong.

    At approximately 100 hours both squadrons approached their objectives . Their navigation vehicles had broken down, so navigators got into other vehicles, therefore no compasses -- only dead reckoning -- in an area which was thick with smoke. Consequently, all "Fantails" had maneuvered far to the left and were actually nearing objective on the shore line,

    Further, the navigators previously had lost radio contact in addition to visual contact. Therefore, Command Hudson Royal Navy, the senior navigator, in the command "Fantail" of the Provisional Regimental Commander, Major H. B.. Fowler, took over navigation by dead reckoning. His vehicle had broken down too. To add to the temporary confusion, we arrived about 50 minutes early and had to wait in the water to go in. In addition, despite the fact that we carried double the amount of smoke as before, the smoke screen

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began to lift -- and the smoke platoon leader radioed; "Ten more minutes of smoke."   This was 40 minutes before we were to begin landing. The Brigadier had to call on land based artillery to fire smoke shells on the landing sites, and hope they had enough to cover us during the landing.

    "A" Squadron began landing at 1135 hours, on their alternate objective. When the vehicles touched down, friendly infantry had captured the ground, so there was no fight there, or even a smell of one. "A" Squadron unloaded and returned to base.

"B" Squadron attempted to land on its objective. The first troop touched down at 1200 hours and encountered anti-tank fire. It lost eight vehicles, knocked out and destroyed -- the entire first troop. Eight men were either killed ao captured, listed as missing , eight others were wounded.   The enemy held the ground with plenty of infantry and artillery. The Infantry Commander with "B" squadron and the Squadron Leader decided to land at the "A" Squadron sire, because opposition was too great to attempt further landings.

    "B" Squadron moved southeast one and one-half kilometers, unloaded troops under considerable enemy mortar and artillery fire which was getting heavier all the time. They left the landing area, beginning at 1530, and returned to bivouac.

    CONCLUSION:

    That the two amphibious operations against the enemy were highly successful can scarcely br doubted.   As has been previously stated, the front lines of the right flank of the EIGHT ARMY were substantially advance, prisoners were taken, enemy material was destroyed -- including tanks knocked out by the ludicrously impudent, lightly armed, thin-skinned LVT. The chief success of the operations, however, was the fact that the flanking tactic over ground the enemy had given little thought to as a battle field, started and as the operation, intensified diversion of troops from other strongly defended sectors where the main effort in the spring offensive was being made. This was the intention of the high command, this is what hundreds of British and Americans worked hard and intensely to train for. And this precisely what was accomplish, to the pride and great credit to very individual who met and fought the foe on the new, watery battle fields of LAKE COMACCHIO.

signed

Herbert B. Fowler
Major, 755 Tank Battalion,
Commanding

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